In The House of Lords
Woodcourt v Vholes
Mrs Ada Clare told Mr Vholes that she wished to transfer 400 shares in a private company (Crook Ltd) to her friend Harold Skimpole. Mr Vholes, a solicitor, was secretary of the company. Ada signed a share transfer form and gave it to Mr Vholes. He placed the form in a file but took no further action prior to Ada’s death, apart from to write to Mr Skimpole. In the letter he informed Mr Skimpole that his firm had been instructed to arrange for the transfer of the 400 shares and that he need take no further action. Ada’s will made no specific mention of the gift of 400 shares to Mr Skimpole.
When Ada visited Mr Vholes’ office she had been in good health and not anticipating her imminent death. Shortly afterwards she contracted an unknown virus and was taken gravely ill. At her sick bed, Ada told her vicar, the Reverend Chadband, that she wished to transfer her country cottage to him. She explained that Mr Vholes had custody of the deeds and would hand them over. She then passed Mr Vholes’ business card to the Reverend Chadband. She died moments later.
Following Ada’s death, Mr Vholes indicated that he intended to complete the transfer of the land to the Reverend Chadband and to complete the transfer of the shares to Mr Skimpole, including registration of Mr Skimpole as the new owner.
The present action was brought by the residuary beneficiary of Ada’s will, Mrs Esther Woodcourt, objecting to the transfer of the cottage and the shares.
The decision at first instance to uphold both transfers was upheld in the Court of Appeal. It was held that the transfer of the shares had been completed during Ada’s lifetime, and that the cottage had been validly transferred by donatio mortis causa.
The present appeal is brought to the House of Lords on the following grounds:
1. That an intended lifetime transfer of shares is not binding on the transferor unless the act of transfer becomes irrevocable during the lifetime of the transferor. In the instant case the transferor had a locus poenitentiae until the moment she died, and accordingly there had been no valid transfer.
2. That the requirements for a valid donatio mortis causa of land had not been satisfied on the facts of the instant case.
© Gary Watt 2007
