| Description | | - Most comprehensive analysis of coalition politics to date
- New approach to the conceptual understanding of coalition politics
| Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe
provides a comprehensive analysis of coalition politics in Western Europe over the post-1945 period. It champions a dynamic approach using bargaining and transaction cost theory to understand the 'life cycle' of parliamentary politics. After a review of the literature the theory chapter addresses the roles of
bargaining and transaction costs in coalition governance. Eight comparative chapters address the topics of government formation, cabinet membership, coalition agreements, portfolio allocation, conflict management, cabinet termination and duration, and the electoral consequences of coalition politics. The book is based on the most comprehensive data set ever employed in coalition studies, which
includes both coalitional and single-party countries and governments. Each chapter provides a comparative overview of its topic and state-of-the art statistical analysis. Conceptually and empirically the study argues for an integrated approach to coalition politics, stressing six clusters of explanatory factors: country-specific and temporal circumstances, 'structural attributes', actors'
preferences, institutions, the bargaining environment, and 'critical events'. While the importance of different causal factors varies between the various phases of the parliamentary life cycle, no facet of coalition politics can be understood without reference to several of these factors.
Comparative Politics
is a series for students and teachers of political science that deals with
contemporary issues in comparative government and politics. The General Editors are David M. Farrell, Jean Monnet Chair in European Politics and Head of School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester and Alfio Mastropaolo, University of Turin. The series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research.
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Readership: Scholars and students of political science, particularly those interested in parliamentary systems, Western European politics, and party politics.
| Contents |
1.
Coalition Theory and Cabinet Governance: An Introduction
,
Wolfgang C. Muller, Torbjorn Bergman, and Kaare Strom
2.
Bargaining, Transaction Costs, and Coalition Governance
,
Arthur Lupia and Kaare Strom
3.
The Empirical Study of Cabinet Governance
,
Torbjorn Bergman, Elisabeth R. Gerber, Scott Kastner, and Benjamin Nyblade
4.
Uncertainty and Complexity in Cabinet Formation
,
Lieven De Winter and Patrick Dumont
5.
Coalition Agreements and Cabinet Governance
,
Wolfgang C. Muller and Kaare Strom
6.
Government Formation and Cabinet Type in Parliamentary Democracies
,
Paul Mitchell and Benjamin Nyblade
7.
Portfolio Allocation
,
Luca Verzichelli
8.
Conflict Management in Coalition Government
,
Rudy B. Andeweg and Arco Timmerman
9.
Cabinet Termination in Western Europe
,
Erik Damgaard
10.
Institutions, Chance and Choices: The Dynamics of Cabinet Survival in the Parliamentary Democracies of Western Europe (1945-1999)
,
Thomas Saalfeld
11.
Coalition Membership and Electoral Performance
,
Hanne Marthe Narud and Henry Valen
12.
Conclusion: Cabinet Governance in Parliamentary Democracies
,
Kaare Strom, Torbjorn Bergman, Wolfgang C. Muller, and Benjamin Nyblade
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| Authors, editors,
and contributors |
Edited by Kaare Strom, Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego,
Wolfgang C. Muller, Professor of Political Science, University of Mannheim, and
Torbjorn Bergman, Professor of Political Science, University of Umea
|
The specification in this catalogue, including without
limitation price, format, extent, number of illustrations,
and month of publication, was as accurate as
possible at the time the catalogue was compiled.
Occasionally, due to the nature of some contractual restrictions, we
are unable to ship a specific product to a particular territory.
Jacket images are provisional and liable to change before publication.
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