This book is available in Oxford Scholarship Online
| Reviews |
| - '
Schueler has offered a valuable contribution to the literature on reasons explanations of action. Reasons and Purposes
is a worthwhile read for philosophers and psychologists interested in the nature and explanations of human action, as well as those working on human rationality. It presents new challenges to causalists; and it should prove to be a valuable resource for those dissatisfied
with causalist proposals.
' - Philosophical Psychology
|
| Description | | - Powerful argument against a standard and popular view of why we act
- Original and persuasive suggestions for a different way to understand practical reasoning
- Refreshing, lucid, and easy to read
| People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do.
Fred Schueler seeks to replace
such causal views, arguing that they leave out two essential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherently normative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of
reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. |
Readership: Scholars and students of philosophy
| Contents |
1.
1. Purposes, Causes, and Reasons Explanations
Purposes
2.
Reasons and Causes
3.
Causes and Causal Explanations
4.
2. Non Telelogical Explanations of Actions
The Argument for 'The Humean Theory of Motivation'
5.
Are 'Causal' Explanations Unavoidable?
6.
3. Teleological Explanations of Actions
The Need for Teleological Explanaations
7.
Character Traits
8.
4. Explaining in Terms of the Agent's Reasoning
Problems with the Practical Syllogism
9.
Practical Reasoning and the Explanation of Actions
10.
Practical Reasoning and Evaluations
11.
The Principle of Charity
12.
5. The Inherently Normative Nature of Action Explanations
Normative Explanations I: The Deliberative Model
13.
Normative Explanations II: The Agent's Perspective
Bibliography
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| Authors, editors,
and contributors |
G. F. Schueler, Professor of Philosophy, University of New Mexico
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