| Reviews |
| Review(s) from previous edition:
- 'Despite the influence and importance of the study of auctions, the academic literature is dominated by papers that are a struggle to read. Often these papers require a high degree of mathematical sophistication and a familiarity with a large and confusing body of literature. In writing their book, An Introduction to Auction Theory, Flavio Menezes and Paulo
Monteiro have made a substantial contribution to making this literature accessible to students and researchers.' - John Asker, Economic Record
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| Description | | - Makes the sometimes difficult academic literature on auction theory accessible to students and researchers
- Includes a new chapter to provide a guide to recent developments in auction theory
- Provides a step-by-step, self-contained introduction to the theory of auctions
| New to this edition- Paperback edition includes an additional chapter on current developments in auction theory
| The practical importance of auction theory is widely recognized. Indeed, economists have been recognized for their contribution to the design of several auction-like mechanisms, such as the U. S. Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions, the 3G auctions in Europe and beyond, and the auction markets for electricity markets around the world.
Moreover, auction theory is now seen as
an important component of an economist's training. For example, some of the more celebrated results from the single-object auction theory are now usually taught in advanced undergraduate and first-year graduate courses on the economics of information. The techniques and insights gained from the study of auction theory provide a useful starting point for those who want to venture into the
economics of information, mechanism design, and regulatory economics.
This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of the theory of auctions. The aim is to provide an introductory textbook that will allow students and readers with a calculus background to work through all the basic results. Coverage includes: the basic independent-private-model; the effects of introducing
correlation in valuations on equilibrium behaviour and the seller's expected revenue; mechanism design; and the theory of multi-object auctions. The paperback edition of the text includes a new chapter which acts as a guide to current developments in auction theory. |
Readership: Academics and students studying auctions, the economics of information, mechanism design, and regulatory economics.
| Authors, editors,
and contributors |
Flavio M. Menezes, University of Queensland and
Paulo K. Monteiro, Escola de Pos-Graduacao em Economia da FGV
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The specification in this catalogue, including without
limitation price, format, extent, number of illustrations,
and month of publication, was as accurate as
possible at the time the catalogue was compiled.
Occasionally, due to the nature of some contractual restrictions, we
are unable to ship a specific product to a particular territory.
Jacket images are provisional and liable to change before publication.
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